Friday, November 28, 2008

Alryyes/Lukács, 12/2: Reading packets available

Professor Ala Alryyes
uses
Georg Lukács
Theory of the Novel
The Historical Novel


Tuesday, December 2, 2008
12:30 p.m. in LC 209
Ginger ale and saltines provided
Reading packets in LC 108



or e-mail CG or AG for an electronic copy of the readings. Or, if you own Lukács' The Theory of the Novel and The Historical Novel, we are reading the following: Theory (Bostock, trans.) pp. 29, 97-101, 112-31; Historical Novel (Mitchell and Mitchell, trans.) pp. 19-24, 30-63.

Click here for the full blog entry.

Thursday, November 27, 2008

Neuman/Hägglund: Meeting Notes, 11/21

On November 21, an intimate pre-Thanksgiving group met to discuss excerpts from Martin Hägglund's new book Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Professor Justin Neuman led our discussion. Also present: Anne DeWitt, Colin Gillis, Andrew Goldstone, Sebastian Lecourt, and Jordan Zweck. In our festive mood we decided not to take detailed minutes, but I invite contributors to contact me (AG) if they would like to add notes or remarks. Briefly: JN introduced the idea of Continental philosophy's turn to ethics, dating from Derrida's Specters of Marx (1994). This turn is more or less synonymous with a turn to religion, especially a growing association between negative theology and deconstruction. Levinas, with his emphasis on ethics and on absolute otherness, has been important to this turn and to Derrida in particular. Hägglund argues that this turn is based on a misreading of Derrida; for Hägglund, Derrida is the exponent of a "radical atheism" which involves not just the denial of God but the denial that the absolutes of theology are even desirable. JN is interested by this argument; in his book project, JN places the turn to ethics in relation to what fiction writers are doing. Our general discussion spent some time puzzling over Hägglund's hard-to-pin-down uses of the terms "absolute peace" and (AD) "violence." We also discussed what the interest of this work might be outside of Continental philosophy, say for literary studies or for other kinds of philosophical ethics. We wondered about the stakes of an argument like Hägglund's--whether the totalizing desires (for immortality, for peace, for justice) that he attempts to deconstruct are actually felt by people, or whether (SL) he was deconstructing a straw man. AG and CG had a back-and-forth about otherness and ethics. SL is interested in Hägglund's ideas of "survival" in relation to the Victorian ideas of anthropological survivals that he has encountered in his research.

Click here for the full blog entry.

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Neuman/Hägglund, 11/21: Packets available

Our next Using Theory session will be next Friday, November 21, at 12:30 p.m. in LC 319. Professor Justin Neuman will lead our discussion of excerpts from Martin Hägglund's new book, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. Reading packets are now available on the windowsill of the department lounge. In the meantime, launch discussion with comments here!

Click here for the full blog entry.

Friday, October 31, 2008

Hayden/Glissant, 10/15: Meeting Minutes

On October 15, Gabriele Hayden led our discussion of Édouard Glissant's Poetics of Relation and Monika Kaup's "'The Future is Entirely Fabulous': The Baroque Genealogy of Latin America's Modernity," MLQ 68, no. 2 (2007) (abstract). Many thanks to Emily Setina for taking minutes. Please e-mail Andrew Goldstone if he has mistranscribed your comments; and please use the comments function below at will.

Follow the link to the full post for the minutes of our world-spanning discussion!



Present: Anne DeWitt, Colin Gillis, Andrew Goldstone, Gabriele Hayden, Susannah Hollister, Ben LaBreche, John Muse, Justin Neuman, Emily Setina, Jordan Zweck.

GH, introduction. Poetics of Relation was throwing you in at the deep end. Glissant's earlier work is more specific about the kind of critiques he's making. You can see the elements out of which this book develops. In particular:


  1. A critique of history as an attempt to fix reality in a hierarchical discourse, with some regions of the world designated ahistorical, as in Hegel;

  2. A critique of (Eurocentric) periodization--this is what interests GH the most recently; cf. the Kaup reading--as a way of obscuring Caribbean agency and experience within history. When French history is used to periodize, the Caribbean can only be seen as responding to France. Kaup offers the idea of the Neobaroque. For Latin America, this combines modernism and post-modernism in an alternative periodicity, with a different model of what modernity and the twentieth century mean. I wonder: do these connectiosn to the baroque ever end?

  3. A critique of language in relationship to identity



Andrew Goldstone: How will this play into the work you're doing now?

GH: My first two dissertation chapters show how Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams are indebted to the Spanish baroque, the aesthetic of which they coopt for modernism. It's close to home for Williams, in his mother's mixed background; and the techniques of the baroque let him get around an Anglo model. My strategic question: should these ideas of the baroque belong just in these chapters or could I use it as a framework for the whole dissertation? For example, my original idea was to use it for thinking about Hughes as someone interested in connecting peripheries to each other.

Colin Gillis: I like the neo-baroque as an alternative to talking about "modernism," but it seems kind of like a relabelling of a standard modern vs. premodern dichotomy.

GH: Well, the historical baroque is already more complicated--is it just in Spain, or is it formed in the Americas as well?

Justin Neuman: Let's go back to a more basic question: what is the baroque denominating here? How does it relate to the Renaissance baroque? It's a troubled issue; it has a clear meaning in art-history--the monumental, the ornate--as a counterpart to the early modern era. Can we get at this question of relabelling by getting at what the baroque is engaged in?

AG: It's important to recall that there was a time when "Classicism" was important for talking about modernism, but that time has receded. So the opposition of baroque and classical doesn't seem so important for us--but in a French context, Classicism is the dominant art-historical period. The turn against it is far more revolutionary than it seems to us, in a literary history where TS Eliot lays simultaneous claim to Donne and classicism.

GH: As for defining the Baroque, it has a very concrete meaning in Spanish contexts: in literature, it's associated with the conceit (conceptismo), with wit, with outrageous erudition or cultismo. The archetypical Baroque writer is Góngora, whose language is crazy, altered in every possible way. These literary techniques are thus associated with the historical Baroque.

CG: When I say the Neobaroque looks like a relabelling, it's because it still seems to talk in terms of the same paradigm of modernism in terms of formal criteria drawn from European ideas of art and literature.

AG: Well, what else is it going to be? I don't want to defend a Eurocentric model, but you can't get around the kinds of formal changes Glissant names--the poetics of depth, language-in-itself, structure. They have to figure in any history. But when you relabel, that can get you somewhere by letting you tell other histories.

CG: Why does Europe have to be the center? Surely there must be other structures in world literature than Europe at the center and everywhere else at the periphery.

GH: You can see this dynamic at work in the historical baroque in Marvell and the Reformation. Is he authoritarian? Revolutionary? Is his baroque a liberatory cultural mixture? Or just another version of domination? If you don't go for mixture, you fall back on ideas of indigeneity--but that implies problematic ideas of purity. So is the baroque colonizing or decolonizing?

Ben Labreche: Does the fact that the historical label seem so strained mean you should keep the general idea but lose the label? Because in the historical baroque, it's definitely an aesthetic that's embraced by people in power.

GH: Well, in Latin American baroque you can see people building the baroque cathedrals but slipping in their local gods in the details. The baroque allows room for proliferation.

AG: And in any case it's hard to translate the authoritarian baroque into Anglo-American history.

BL: Consider the Counter-reformation: yes, it's using emotionalism to bring in the common people, but on the other hand it's definitely authoritarian.

GH: Well, in Latin America the Neobaroque is a strong tradition: it largely overlaps, for example, with the "marvelous real." It might be problematic for Anglo-American scholarship.

BL: How much credence do we give to the idea that Donne belongs to this baroque? The representative of the English baroque might be Dryden--but who, again, celebrates authority.

JN: Why is it important to Latin American writers to be labelling their work baroque, given its characteristics in Europe? What is at stake in this appropriation of form? Is this a relabelling of high modernism from below?

GH: It's part of the Latin American desire to declare independence from the US too, by valorizing the Spanish literary tradition. At the same time, it reminds us that, as Wallerstein says, the European baroque was set off by the influx of wealth from the colonies. So the baroque invokes colonization from the beginning.

GH: What I wonder is: at specific moments modern writers translate the Spanish baroque. But does the Baroque usefully indicate something larger?

CG: You might not need the theory at all. You have found these wonderful connections in the archive; Glissant's argument is for the Baroque as a world system. Does it really apply?

AG: It does matter to GH's account of the genealogy of Pound and Williams's poetics. Is it that their modernism was already in the air, and they fastened on the Spanish baroque texts because it resembled that modernism---or do you make the stronger claim that their modernism came out of their engagement with the Baroque?

GH: Pound read the Spanish writers eight years before he ever took an interest in Chinese. So the question becomes: did he ditch the Spanish influence for something new? Or did he hold on to something even though he stopped referring to the Spanish baroque overtly?

John Muse: The two alternatives could exist together as parallel genealogies.

GH: Somehow it's more powerful to say that there's a separate tradition in Latin America that rhymes with modernism, but differs from it.

CG: Are other scholars talking about the Baroque?

GH: It's in the pipeline, with the work of Kaup et al. coming out. There's a push toward alternate genealogies. For example, the baroque (Calderón especially) was important to German Romanticism. And that's Walter Benjamin's genealogy, why he comes to the baroque. So it's a trans-European phenomenon.

AG: And a good way to link modernist studies to Caribbean studies.

JN: Why preserve the moniker "modern" at all? I wonder this about all the alternate-modernity theorists--why keep the pre-modern/modern divide? Why do we care about expanding "modernity"? What do we mean when we talk about the modern in this way?

CG: We expand the term to explode it from within. The term "modernism" doesn't really work; there are significant and important differences between the literary movements it's applied to. Gradually, European "modernism" will become a smaller part of early twentieth century studies.

JM: How do Latin American scholars deal with the different assumptions between Anglo-American "modernism" and "modernismo"?

GH: "Modernismo" means something more like our fin de siècle: it's influenced by Mallarmé. Rubén Darío and a Symbolist poetics. So a lot of people in the Latin American context have taken on post-modernism while leaving their relationship to modernism unclear.

AG: As for JN's question: people care about begin modern because at a basic level they care about the basics of modernity--industrialization, social mobility, etc. Our own question as shcolars of culture is whether this basic idea of historical modernity really matches up with particular "modernist" cultural movements.

JN: Exactly. I was also shocked by Glissant's use of the term "errantry"--with its appalling connotations.

BL: And couldn't you also associate the Baroque with the feminine?

GH: There's the idea of the Black Legend--which feminizes people in Catholic countries by conceiving of them as subordinated to an authoritarian regime. What I took from Glissant's "errantry" was the recognition that pieces of culture can travel anyway. The history of the Caribbean is a history of violence, as Glissant knows, but he also knows that that violent history led to the foundation of the something he's celebrating. He is trying to theorize center and periphery in ways that will ultimately abolish them. That's his utopian gesture at the end: turning to the periphery will abolish the dichotomy.

Click here for the full blog entry.

Friday, October 10, 2008

Hayden/Glissant, 10/15: Packets available

Reading packets are now available for our next Using Theory session in the department lounge. Gabriele Hayden G6 will lead our discussion of Édouard Glissant's Poetics of Relation. Gabriele has also included an excerpt from an important recent MLQ essay by Monika Kaup on the Baroque and Latin American Modernity. We will meet on Wednesday, Oct. 15, at 1 p.m. in WLH 115. In the meantime, preliminary discussion can begin in the comments to this post!

Click here for the full blog entry.

Wednesday, October 8, 2008

Goldstone/Bourdieu, 9/29: Meeting Minutes

On Monday 9/29 Andrew Goldstone led a discussion of excerpts from Pierre Bourdieu's The Rules of Art. Many thanks to Dave Gorin for taking minutes, which AG has lightly edited. Corrections to AG's and DG's memorial reconstructions are very welcome, as are comments on the post! For the full minutes, follow the link to the full post.


Present: Emily Coit, Anne DeWitt, Andy Eggers, Colin Gillis, Dave Gorin, Langdon Hammer, KC Harrison, Gabriele Hayden, Susannah Hollister, Eugenia Kelbert, Nathan Suhr-Sytsma, Jordan Zweck.

AG: I realize I threw you in the deep end with the section on method. It's the hardest part of the book to read. He's not a very good writer, and the translation is very bad. The two sizes of type are Bourdieu's own device.

Let me take a second to give you an idea of what this is all about. Look at the graph on p. 6. This diagrams the social world of Flaubert's novel, and the entire book is about how this diagram came to be written. Why does Flaubert have this knowledge of his social world? That's what Bourdieu is trying to solve, and requires him to create a whole theory.

Background on Bourdieu: he's atypical among French theorists. He's not a Parisian but comes from the sticks, the son of a postal worker. Agreg in philosophy, but then he went to do fieldwork in his home village and in Algeria. He becomes a social scientist instead of a philosopher. And unlike thinkers of '68 like Lacan, Derrida, or Althusser, he is taken seriously in the American social sciences, though he's provoked plenty of dispute and frustration. He matters.

Some writers on Bourdieu: John Guillory (see "Bourdieu's Refusal" [Yale network only]); Michèle Lamont; Pascale Casanova.

Here's how I came to Bourdieu. The salient piece of my background here is Harvard poetry courses: I took them, and they made a big impact. When I came here, I believed in the primacy of form, I despised the heresy of paraphrase, and so on. I had planned a dissertation which more or less defended these Harvard poetry principles. Then Lanny Hammer suggested that I read this book. It's a theory of modernism and aestheticism put back in its historical context. Furthermore, I immediately applied it to my own academic development; watching Bourdieu describe the rules of art made me reflect on the rules of the academic world and to see myself as a participant in a field. A quick example: the hierarchy of publishers--some academic prestiges are much higher prestige or "symbolic capital" than others. And we all make use of our own implicit knowledge of the hierarchy of publishers--but suddenly I was aware of this. I started trying to "objectivate" the institutional space, thinking of it as an object of study and not just something to obey.

But Bourdieu is also an aesthete. He loves modernism and thinks of it as one of the essential historical events in modernity. There's a widespread misunderstanding that he stands for reductive approaches to literature. In fact he wants to understand what kind of world artists make for themselves in setting out the position of art for art's sake. That love of form, in the manner of Harvard poetry courses, is still there in Bourdieu, but in a less transcendental framework.

Last year we spent a lot of time talking about what it means when you use theory. I see 3 possibilities. The first: for a suggestive quality. The second: introducing a whole new subject matter. This is a typical use of queer theory, postcolonial theory, deconstruction. And I do use Bourdieu this way, for a thematics of autonomy.

But there is a stronger use: methodological. Theory can shape our procedures and disciplinary aims. The best example is New Historicism, which shifts the object of study from literary texts to literary texts in certain kind of contexts, with a strong emphasis not on the literary itself but on history and politics. Now Bourdieu's approach is related to New Historicism, but his procedures are very different from the principally anecdotal method New Historicism uses. Instead of putting a few texts (literary, cultural, political) in relation to one another, Bourdieu says to put texts in relation to entire fields.

I think this does imply the necessity of: statistics, hypothesis testing, falsifiable models, a determinist idea of artistic production. This is necessary for addressing problems with New Historicism--for more rigorous procedures of knowledge production.

Dave Gorin: I am skeptical of the rhetoric of liberation in the Preface.

Colin Gillis: Yes, look at the last sentence of preface. We get liberated into what? I didn't have the same attachement to aestheticism. I'm not breathing the air of art for art's sake. Why do we need to salvage that original appreciation as an impulse for criticism?

Anne DeWitt: I was also somewhat surprised by the move in the preface. I was not expecting Bourdieu to make that appreciative move. Was he doing this to reassure people who feel upset by his sociological approach?

AG: It's important to think of Bourdieu's book as intervening in a French literary culture that clings more to aestheticism than ours does. He does want you to take his credentials as an aesthete seriously.

CG: Whereas if you're writing for an American audience, you would say the opposite. Not: no internal reading without external analysis, but no external analysis without internal reading.

Gabriele Hayden: I was wondering of we could get to some of the questions DG was raising through questions about your critical practice, AG. I've looked at dissertations that go systematically through periodicals to show the existence of racial stereotypes at a particular historical moment. A lot of work. There's a question of scope; I already feel like I'm juggling the universe...

AG: There's a big gap between what I see as real standards of proof and what we can do, especially as dissertating students. But ultimately, yes, I think we're going to have to resign ourselves to verifying more rigorously the things that we already know.

GH: How do you articulate that move from the contextual to the internal? I'm interested in thinking about style itself as signifying things in a political framework. But how do you make those moves?

AG (with handout from a thesis chapter): It's hard. What you need is a relation between a whole field of literary practice and those political questions. Bourdieu's 19th-century French example is the poetic choice between free verse and alexandrines. That formal choice is political; the choice of free verse has a politically rebellious aspect. But that comes out of a whole matrix of relations between the political world and the aesthetic world, where the position of aesthetic rebellion is aligned with an anti-establishment bohemia, and that of aesthetic conservatism with the political establishment. In my thesis chapter, I argue that Barnes is developing a particular kind of writing, but she's also living in a certain way-- the American in Paris, flamboyant, bohemian, hard-drinking, a whole set of related characteristics of her life-- and I want to make a relation between the style of writing and her style of life. In the conventional account, modernist expats become experimental stylists because, having left home, they've defamiliarized their surroundings. This is a bit fishy--where are the causal mechanisms? So I use Bourdieu to make a different point: the defamiliarizing style and the lifestyle are all part of one enterprise, the enterprise of carving out an autonomous position as a professional modernist writer. My one piece of sociological evidence is the preface Eliot writes to Nightwood calling it purely an achievement of style: Barnes gets received as a practitioner of pure art.

CG: GH, you're talking about anthologies, and AG, you're talking about lifestyle. It's harder to use Bourdieu to talk about reception than it is to use him to talk about production. As critics, we talk about the life of texts in social worlds. You can use Bourdieu to talk about that, but it's complicated.

Emily Coit: Hard because you need to gather data?

CG: It's hard to gather data about the use of texts.

AG: Yes. For the present day, Bourdieu does fieldwork on people: surveys, interviews. For earlier periods, you have to do broad archival reading.

CG: For example, in the modernist period, people are putting together literature anthologies to legitimize minority experience.

GH: Right, aesthetic autonomy is being deployed for explicitly political means. African-Americans claim recognition and status because they can produce autonomous art.

AG: Notice then that the claim for inclusion is still on the basis of the "rules of art"--the claim to autonomy. But CG, you're right that Bourdieu's theory squeezes things down into categories of autonomous and not.

NSS: Why do you want us to head in the directions you suggested Bourdieu leads?

EC: The critical practice Bourdieu advocates is endlessly self-reflexive. We're talking here about Bourdieu's work on the perceived autonomy of art, but he also studies the perceived sanctity of academic endeavor. I'm asking a very personal question: in using his theory in your own work, do you ever find the self-reflexivity demanded by him paralyzing? Does it make you uncomfortable?

AG: It does get kind of tiresome, and not that interesting for readers, to always come back to the norms of the profession. I don't know how to get beyond that yet. As to the question of what it's all for...I think you need to separate questions of what scholarly work must be for from how to do that work.

NSS: It raised my eyebrows when Bourdieu speaks of forsaking the sensory for the intelligible. He's going to see what we can't reach at the level of anecdote. But when I read criticism, what I like is grounded in stories of what people actually did and their relations.

AG: It is threatening in that it forces you to see the sensuous way of relating as something you can only do as a participant in the world of art, and not as a sociologist.

GH: The penultimate sentence of the preface [notes unclear here--ed.] By stepping back, you're going to tally the specific instances and get the whole model. And the anecdotal approach can't do that.

NSS: That's helpful. Why do I feel that a story or anecdote is more useful than an abstract story about how they met?

AG: True explanations don't necessarily come from sensuous, specific details, despite the appeal of the latter.

GH: A lot of the poets we read in the Working Group on Contemporary Poetry seem to be addressing some of these problems of materiality and the autonomy of art, impurity, all these things that make us uncomfortable--and they're making awesome art about it. Art goes on.

AG: Art goes on, having migrated into the university--as Lanny Hammer's work discusses. It's not coincidental that university poets write about issues that are dear to us.

LH: In that statement at the end of Bourdieu's Preface, it seems like the important world is "human." The sentence is a kind of credo. You can think about Bourdieu in relation to Marx and Marx's wanting to turn idealism on its head. Bourdieu wants to provide a human theory of the work of art, turning Flaubert on his head. The emphasis, as in Marx, falls on the maker in a powerful way that gestures, with the idea of the buried universal (in the writer), to the human. The question I was going to ask was: does Bourdieu talk about "truth"? He talks about objectivity, but Truth?

AG: I am definitely conflating what Bourdieu calls objectivity with truth. I do think that for Bourdieu, he does have a classically Enlightenment-style, purist idea of why objectivity matters. He is a political activist, but at the end of his sociology is the goal of the disinterested pursuit of truth. What would objectivity be if not related to truth?

LH: What do you think objectivity means? One of the virtues of art is the way it objectifies social relations...

AG: I don't have anything deep to say about this, but we could at least say that objectivity makes things visible potentially to all human observers, instead of confining forms of knowledge to particular social strata.

LH: Which is how it hooks up with the idea of the universal.

AG: The universal is only grasped from your position, but is (optimistically) potentially available to all. Let's look at the passage on 108 [on Flaubert's "work on form" and the "anamnesis" of his knowledge of the field of power]. Do you buy this?

CG: It makes the critic absolutely central.

AG: Is it a plausible theory? How does this look to the economist?

Andy Eggers: Why do you want to know what Flaubert is carrying around in his head?

AG: Bourdieu is doing a kind of anthropology. He wants to know what it means to be a writer in his time, and this is his way of getting at it. Flaubert knows, in the practical way of a social agent, that there's a world of the powerful, then a world of bohemia.

AD: This is the idea of habitus: Flaubert knows, but doesn't know he knows.

SH: Is it important that Flaubert doesn't know?

AG: This gets back to Colin's point on the importance of the critic's ability to unearth the buried knowledge. Bourdieu actually goes so far as to say that the only way to be liberated is to get the objective knowledge of the situation that you're in.

CG: This is what the historian says to the literary critic: why are you interested in literature and not all historical documents? And we say that artists are particularly good at capturing the social reality. The Rules of Art argues that Sentimental Education is the best evidence for this. But if you change what evidence you're looking at, maybe you'll come up with an answer that proves that Flaubert was wrong about the social field. In the end, Bourdieu attributes a real genius to Flaubert.

EC: The emphasis on appreciation that you mentioned is another response to the historian's critique.

CG: How do we find which texts and artists have captured truth / the social field? He's talking about Flaubert, not Audre Lord.

AG: In a way The Rules of Art is Bourdieu's long justification for liking Flaubert. This is my impasse: this is so specific to Anglo-French modernism. You'd have to do all this work over again if you want to take this theory somewhere else.

GH: Now I'm trying to think about the baroque and a whole other genealogy of moderism. In Spain, you're not supposed to talk about modernism, but the baroque tradition and the neobaroque. And I think there's a lot you can take from Bourdieu about the relation between historical structures and style and politics. Is baroque style something that imposes hegemony or an opportunity for disruption? You could take some of Bourdieu's questions, and maybe get different answers.

Click here for the full blog entry.

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

Fry/Departmental History, 9/15: Minutes

The first Using Theory meeting of the year was a special session on the history of the Yale English department, led by Professor Paul Fry. Many thanks to Julia Fawcett for taking notes for the minutes (below; follow the link to the full post). If AG has managed to garble your comments in transmission, please write him, and he will correct these minutes. We invite continuing discussion through comments on this post!


Paul Fry, introduction: Approaching ourselves is a tricky business; there is a debate about whom to include. Question to answer today: is there somehow an essential character of this department? The department is related to the nature of the university: we like to think of ourselves as diverse, but Yale has a history as an elite (or elitist) institution--the university began as theocentric; later, its aim was to educate gentlemen.

Does this distinguish Yale from other universities? Harvard and Princeton have the same history (with some subtle differences). This history does distinguish us from UVA, William and Mary, Penn--places that began as secular institutions.

Only belatedly was Yale a research institution (compare to Stanford and Hopkins). Yale followed Cardinal Newman's espousal in The Idea of a University of universities as spreading knowledge rather than advancing knowledge. Harvard was shaped by President Eliot's core curriculum in the 1880s-1890s; Yale had no such thing. (The core curriculum at Harvard prompted Matthew Arnold's lectures in favor of the study of the classics.) Yale resisted cosmopolitan diversity until after WWII; but Geoffrey Hartman points out that Yale too had continental scholars like Erich Auerbach (see epilogue to The Scholar's Tale).

How does this relate to the English Department? People would say we are famous for close-reading and a hermeneutic orientation. The criticism is that this implies turning inward as a way to avoid the socio-historical issues of the time. Against this John Guillory argues in Cultural Capital that this is no objection to teaching the careful reading of canonical works: he says that rigorous and careful reading must perforce be critical reading, and can never unconditionally confirm the norms of dominance or authority. Still, some say that it makes sense that we aren't known for vanguard socio-historical theories because of this charge of elitism; others would argue that we deal with these larger issues in our own way.

Discussion

Andrew Kau: What is our relationship to the Literature/Comparative Literature department?

PF: The inter-departmental dynamic has been very fruitful. Wellek worked closely with Brooks and Wimsatt, both of whom were New Critics and Anglocentric; Wellek's own view is influenced by the English department view (represented by Brooks and Wimsatt); his mammoth history of criticism, in trying to cover everything, dilutes his own formalist perspective. Similarly, Auerbach was a mentor to many who had joint appointments in English and Comp Lit. Later, one can imagine feelings of resentment in the English department toward Comp Lit because the Yale School emerged from Comp Lit, but the English Department gets the credit/blame for it. Today, the Yale School is no longer active in Comp Lit, but it's alive and well in the German Department.

Andrew Goldstone: Your history is valuable because it doesn't start where most histories of criticism start, with New Criticism. Instead, it sees New Criticism as in the context of earlier traditions (philology, appreciation, etc). Are there survivals of schools of criticism like appreciation and philology still around in what we do today?

PF: Jay Parini's Defense of Poetry is an interesting example of appreciation. Contemporary journalistic literary criticism does more than appreciate; in fact it often does the opposite but that's all part of the same enterprise. Small liberal arts colleges are places where appreciation is most alive and well. The trouble with appreciation is that it's linked historically to gentlemanly amateurism; this is what the philologists hated about it. They thought of themselves as professional, specialized, scientifically-oriented. Gerald Graff's Professing Literature is good on this. But the New Critics thought the philologists were not as scientific as they wanted to believe. Like the Russian formalists, the New Critics asked their predecessors: have you really thought about the object you're studying? Recent textual critics represent a belated version of philology: Fredson Bowers, Jerome McGann. Textual criticism takes methodological rigor and precision; there are hard problems and ongoing debates. At Indiana University, e.g., philology is alive and well; this is often the case in land grant schools.

Paul Grimstad: Yale and Harvard were both begun as divinity schools; is this connected to their present-day identity as the last bastions of a type of hermeneutic intricacy? Is there a link between scriptural exegesis and this commitment to close-reading?

PF: I think there is certainly a connection to scriptural reading, through the history of hermeneutics: from Protestants getting together to read the Bible to the democratic interpretation of a constitution; of course this is related to the interpretation of literature. Early scholars of vernacular literature like Theobald were mocked because they were thought to be making difficulties out of texts that any gentleman understood. Biblical criticism spreads to literature: compare the mystery of the Biblical parables, to their imitations in Romantic parables: stories that are deceptively simple but require interpretation to be understood. Thus religious enthusiasm for the Bible translates into enthusiasm for the secular word. This is part of the indictment of the English Department as an institution--that it is fetishizing literature as a secular experience.

Caleb Smith: The history of Yale seems always to turn on contrasting close-reading criticism with this vast Other. For most of that long history (and within PF's essay) this conflict is taking place within the English Department itself, characterized by arguments advanced by famous professors. But humanities departments are rethinking their roles within the university more seriously now then ever since the inception of the idea of an English Department. Has the close-reading paradigm worn out its legitimacy? Are there other questions we should be asking about the role of the English Department in the university? What about our role in teaching students how to write? Is that another way to think of our contribution?

PF: A couple of points: (1) The teaching of writing and oratory are part of this long history and have always been part of the English department. The problem is that the teaching of writing was initially thought of in an elitist context, as teaching gentlemen how to write, rather than as a necessary skill some students might lack. A while ago there was an effort to revive "eloquence studies": Joel Schiavone, a former Yale student from an underprvileged background, heavily sponsored this revival here a few years ago, arguing it wasn't just something for gentlemen. Even now, though English 114 and 115 are very carefully devised, English 120 [a less introductory, non-fiction writing class--ed.] is our signature writing class. Daily Themes is a somewhat uneasy index of what we take to be important: it's taken for granted that the teaching of writing need not be remedial, though this is less and less the case as the demography of the university shifts. Yale has always been committed to teaching writing, though perhaps there is a need to reexamine this commitment now.

(2) Our relationship to other humanities departments: We need to be clear about our object of study and how this object is different from other departments' objects. The borders of the disciplines, however, must be increasingly permeable. But it's important that criticism be dictated by how we define our object of study. In the Yale English department should we eschew a concept of literature or the literary and say that our object is discursivity?
But then interdisciplinarity raises flags; the openness of borders needs "border patrols"--there's a question to this day about how this interface works. At what level of generality do studies become or cease to be meaningful? The disciplines should be a basis for interdisciplinarity.

Tom Koenigs: What about the MFA/creative writing option? What is Yale's position on that?

PF: Yale's new 4-course, not 2-course, creative writing track for undergraduates is a step towards this, though we don't have a writing program the way that the University of Iowa has a writing program. This question takes us back to the issue of an elite institution. Harvard is worse; when I was there, they didn't offer drawing or painting or writing because these were believed to be vocational pursuits. [The Visual and Environmental Studies major has changed this situation somewhat recently, but it, like the extra-departmental Expository Writing program, still clearly resides on the institutional margins.--ed.]

Andrew Goldstone: It is said that the Harvard music department's philosophy is that music should be seen and not heard.

PF: Yale has flirted with this, and there's no creative writing program due in part to this anti-vocational bias. But this is starting to break down.

John Muse: But Ph.D programs, more and more, are becoming vocational schools.

PF: I was talking about undergrad; I can't think of grad programs anywhere that aren't pre-professional.

Langdon Hammer: In the English department it's actually too much professionalization that has led to the dearth of writing classes. The department thought that writing was a less rigorous class to teach than literature, though this is now changing due mostly to changes in undergraduate admissions. The Yale Capital Campaign lists among its priorities nothing in the humanities except the arts and creative writing.

PF: Again, the question is, Who gets to define what a discipline is? If the clarity of the object of study is unquestioned, we're at the center of the discipline; if it's unclear, we're at the margins and defining the margins. This is why it's so important to define the thing we're talking about--other disciplines are readier to define themselves and the implications of what they study. We must define ourselves in order to survive.

AG: What about people who went through Yale and went other places? (The history we're discussing is very faculty-centric; what happened to the students? What are they doing and how did their education influence them?)

PF: What has mattered to Yale grads in terms of fundraising is their attachment to charismatic lecturers--Phelps, Tinker, Sewall, Brodhead--but I don't know if Yale educates more future English profs than other universities.

Langdon Hammer: The Office of Institutional Research could tell us.

PF: But the charismatic lecturers are most important.

Caleb Smith: I agree with the need for specificity of disciplines, but it's the contact between the disciplines that produces this specificity.

AG: Isn't it actually market value?

CS: So how do we articulate the value of the humanities at this moment?

PF: I think that too depends on how we define the object of study.

CS: But there are several applications for our work here, and the object of study depends on those. What is the relationship between literature and writing? Because writing is a place where we are getting more market value right now.

PF: It used to be that the English major was thought to be good preparation for anything because it was a good basis for professionalization. This seems to have changed recently. There are fewer English majors because it's harder to explain to your parents why it's useful. Very few people are choosing it.

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Thursday, September 11, 2008

Fry/Departmental History, 9/15: Preliminary Discussion

The first Fall 2008 Using Theory session features Professor Paul Fry leading a discussion of the history of the Yale English department. Lunch will take place at 1 p.m. in LC 319. Packets with Prof. Fry's draft history are available in the department lounge. We invite you to begin discussing this reading before the lunch, if you like, by submitting comments to this post.

Incidentally--it has come to our attention that the flyers for this session have occasioned some bafflement. AG is solely responsible for them. The individual twice pictured is William Lyon ("Billy") Phelps (served 1892-1933). AG suggests you think of the pictures as the two pillars of our very own Phelps gate.


Discussion questions:
CG: There is no shortage of topics for discussion tomorrow, so I'll keep my question brief. Prof. Fry opens his account of the department's history by pointing out that it has been "an odd quirk of our reputation in the world that opinions [of the department] are never wholly free from concern for 'what Yale's English Department should be doing.'" This is something we've all encountered in one form or another, and surely it has and continues to affect the way others see Yale English. The department is expected to realize conflicting and probably unrealistic ideas of what a top department should be and do. What is unclear to me, however, is the extent to which this "quirk" of our reputation has shaped--and continues to shape--the internal evolution of the department? Another, related question: What is the relationship between the reputation of Yale English and the reputation of Yale University?

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Saturday, August 9, 2008

Fall 2008 Schedule

We are very pleased to announce our schedule of Using Theory brown bag lunches for the fall 2008 semester:

Monday, September 15, at 1 p.m. in LC 319: Paul Fry will lead a special session on the history of the Yale English department.

Monday, September 29, at 1 p.m. in LC 319: Andrew Goldstone uses Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art.

Wednesday, October 15, at 1 p.m.: Gabriele Hayden uses Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation.

Friday, November 21, at 12:30 p.m.: Justin Neuman engages Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life.

Tuesday, December 2, at 12:30 p.m. in LC 209: Ala Alryyes--reading TBA.

Dates TBA for spring sessions led by Jill Campbell, Anne DeWitt, Catherine Flynn, David Scott Kastan, Catherine Nicholson, Jessica Pressman, Patrick Redding, and Emily Setina.

As ever, visit this website for discussion and more information in the week before each session. See you around the seminar table in September!

Schedule last updated: 10/17/2008 AG

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Tuesday, May 6, 2008

Metaprofessional Milk and Cookies: Minutes

On Tuesday, April 29, 2008, we met for the last time this semester to discuss graduate-student professionalization. We used John Guillory's "Preprofessionalism: What Graduate Students Want" and Walter Broughton and William Conlogue's "What Search Committees Want." Jeff Glover made an initial comment on the Guillory, and a spirited and contentious discussion of the readings and of professionalism more generally followed. Andrew Goldstone took minutes and requests corrections and additions from participants. All are welcome to comment. For the full minutes, follow the link to the complete blog entry.

Update: May 12, 2008. Many thanks to those who have written in with additions and corrections to my minutes, including Jeff Glover, Gabriele Hayden, Paul Grimstad, and Anon. I've changed the minutes accordingly (see the full blog entry). More contributions always welcome!


Present: Emily Coit, David Currell, Molly Farrell, Colin Gillis, Jeffrey Glover, Andrew Goldstone, David Gorin, Paul Grimstad, Gabriele Hayden, Andy Heisel, Susannah Hollister, Michael Komorowski, Laura Miles, John Muse, Patrick Redding, William Weber, Jordan Zweck, and about 15 participants who requested anonymity.

AG's note: For this discussion of a sensitive topic, we gave everyone the options of participating as normal, participating anonymously, or participating with comments omitted from the minutes. Many people requested anonymity. I believe that the desire for anonymity is an entirely reasonable response to an extremely fraught situation; but it is also a symptom of a profound institutional problem, for, clearly, the way people feel about the job market situation--and the way the English department, Yale, and the profession have responded to it--prevents them from enjoying the basic academic freedom of speaking freely and publicly on a very relevant subject. In particular I am distressed not to be able to transcribe my notes on an important and extensive discussion of the impact of casualization.

I have not indicated below where comments have been omitted at the request of the participant.

Introductory comment. Jeff Glover: In thinking about the job market, it's important to think not only about your own location but also about the location of others, since where you are in the hierarchy determines what you see, or at least how you feel about what you see. Guillory is writing this piece at a particular moment in the mid-90s when the downturn in the job market seemed to coincide with a shift from literary scholarship to a concern with race, class, and gender.

Discussion. John Muse: Does "What Search Committees Want" revise our view of the market by reminding us how our own location affects our point of view?

Colin Gillis: I have something positive to say about Guillory. He comes at a specific moment, and the essay serves the purpose of disenchantment---he's using the jarring quality of the word "preprofessionalism" against the idea of grad school as some kind of utopian library setting without deadlines or obligations other than contemplation and intellectual development. On the contrary, graduate school is not the opposite of going to business school.

Andrew Goldstone: Another use of Guillory is the way he contextualizes theory within the institution. Guillory taught me to ask: how do developments in the structures of the profession affect research methods and interests?

JM: And a related question: does preprofessionalism skew grad-student work? Whether we think so or not, it's a question worth debating.

Gabriele Hayden: Those questions are important, but I wish that Guillory had addressed money questions. Graduate programs grew because grad students were cheap teaching labor.

AG: Guillory discusses that in his later essay "The System of Graduate Education" [JSTOR], PMLA 115, no. 5 (October 2000): 1154-63.

Anon: JM's question is good. Guillory himself was not under professional pressures: he did his PhD in four years, and converted it right into a book. That's why he has a nostalgic tone.

Jeff Glover: Guillory's comment that much scholarship is "only product" is offensive--its suggestion is that Guillory should write books, and people like me should only be allowed to teach.

Anon: Yet Guillory's right--we all have to slog through crap when we read literary criticism.

Anon: Guillory's comment about professionalization seems to me parallel to discussions about professionalization in the nineteenth century. The shift from Romantic to Victorian eras saw a move from an ideal of artistic inspiration to the man of letters, a professionalization of the author. I am myself neutral on which of the two models is the better one. But setting aside the question of the value to other readers of an article, doesn't it have value for the writer in working out ideas?

Anon: Okay, so couldn't we mark that somehow on the publication?

Laura Miles: Right, that's what grad student journals do. And everyone knows we don't have to read them.

Anon: Then there are aspects of professionalization that pressure people to do work that's actually a waste of time. I see first-year students at conferences giving papers on topics they have no commitment to--that they're not going to write dissertations on.

CG: It's not a question of professionalization or not. Only a question of which strategy of professionalization: either the attempt to ignore everything, produce a dissertation, and get a job with it, or going to conferences, building up a CV, and getting a job with that.

Paul Grimstad: I agree with JG's observation about Guillory's nostalgia, but Guillory's larger point is nevertheless acute. He's saying that there is a positive correlation between the marginalization of literary criticism and its politicization. It's an innovative and falsifiable sociological approach.

Molly Farrell: I want to address this idea of intellectual maturation and the supposed alternatives of preprofessionalization or intellectual development. We're caught in a "justify your existence" model--why didn't you go to law school? This model advocates for the purity of intellectual experience at the same time as it creates disenchantment about literary criticism. But I'm tired of self-justification; can't we just recognize that what we do works in the world, that's it's balanced between the two alternatives?

GH: Is the problem of self-justification specific to our discipline or to the humanities? Non-humanities have higher sellout potential; how would you sell out a PhD on Milton? Our skills aren't convertible into extra-academic jobs in the way other fields' are. This is reflected in the cheapness and increasing casualization of the composition job.

AG: If you look at the MLA Report on the Professionalization of PhD's you'll see that their recommendation is that departments start promoting "BGN" (Business, Government, Non-profit) careers outside the academy.

LM: Isn't there some kind of correlation between the deformations of preprofessionalization and the crisis of the job market? Aren't preprofessionalization and casualization two sides of the same coin?

Emily Coit: There are some huge elephants in the room here. The discussion of being a "sellout"--and the skittishness about the term "job market"--raise a controversial question: To what extent are we--is the University--in this to make a living, and to what extent to do we have a non-profit motive? We should talk explicitly about this.

Anon: This relates to the issue of the devaluation of our work. Measurement is a universal problem for teachers. The tenure track can't compete with casualized labor because the product--student grades--is the same.

AG: And how about measuring research? How's that supposed to happen?

GH: And don't research and teaching interact in a valuable way? How's that assessed?

JM: Right, it's significant that Professionalization Day is synonymous with Publication Day. In fact Professionalization Day ought--as Broughton and Conlogue suggest--to show us that there are many tracks, and more than one model candidate.

Anon: It's not just publications. Teaching a lot--as grad students at other universities do-- brings intellectual maturity, too.

LM: Right, the important point in Broughton and Conlogue is the widespread agreement that the "model candidate is a good teacher."

Anon: And how do you measure teaching competence? It's incredibly hard to bottle that.

JM: Especially since student teaching evaluations mostly measure popularity.

Anon: Are Yale students at a disadvantage not teaching more classes? Do we need to change the priorities of our program?

GH: How do graduate students make the decision whether to teach more or to take a research fellowship? It's hard to get time off to do research once you're a professor, whereas teaching experience you miss in grad school can be recuperated later. Yet the profession is about teaching. And if we want to maintain student interest in literary study it is important that introductory writing classes be taught by ladder faculty committed to literature. At a professional level we're sandwiched between those who think we don't do enough Milton and those who think we should be doing cultural studies in a way that leaves literature behind altogether. Either way, the prestige leads away from teaching. [GH adds: I was thinking in this comment of Marjorie Perloff’s exchange with James Sullivan in PMLA 123.1 (2008), in which Perloff writes that Sullivan “is right to remind us that, even now—not just in some hypothetical future—in most large state universities, ‘English departments are composition departments, and foreign language departments are ‘language learning’ departments’” (255).] [The Perloff-Sullivan exchange is in the "Forum" section, available online here (requires subscription)--ed.]

Anon: There's a problem with the idea of "good jobs" and "bad jobs." People are happiest when teaching--probably. Isn't it grad students who produce the pressure to casualize by wanting to teach the intro and writing courses?

Jeff Glover: Aren't departments the main source of casualizing pressure?

Anon: It's complicated. A few generations ago, senior faculty taught 4/4 loads at Yale; those loads have declined over time in order to give more research time--though I'm not really sure that increased research productivity. And does "casualization" mean the use of part-time teachers, or all non-tenure-track teachers?

JG: Guillory passes the buck on casualization by attributing it to changes in American society as a whole. Deans and departments bear responsibility; couldn't they have had a conversation about the use of casualized labor?

GH: This brings to my mind the recent MLA Newsletter Comment piece by Gerald Graff. [You can download the whole newsletter issue, including Graff's comment, here--ed.] He discusses how, a few generations ago, senior professors taught composition.

Paul Grimstad: It's telling that we should be suspicious of the desire to quantify teaching ability. It shows that the ubiquity of the market has made research in the humanities more and more irrelevant--i.e., you need to go to teaching stats for the raw numbers you could never get from assessing the value of this or that angle of research. This is then another version of Guillory's basic point about how market logic and a certain kind of political engagement go together.

EC: Actually there is a very accurate way to assess the value of what we do using the terminology of the market, a very accurate measure of our exchange value. We may not like it, but it's there. It's demand. Demand for the product we as a discipline offer is going down.

AG: And in fact number of students really does affect funding at the departmental level--but not for individuals.

PG: Guillory is calling for a shift in what we consider appropriate knowledge production in our field--that is, for more relevance. He thinks we should be doing sociological analyses (maybe like the ones he does).

[Much informal discussion followed our hour.]

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Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Placeholder for discussion: Metaprofessional Milk and Cookies, 4/29

Our final Using Theory event of the semester, Metaprofessional Milk and Cookies, will take place on April 29 at 4 p.m.--note the special time. It will involve neither saltines nor ginger ale, at least in the literal sense, but it will involve milk and cookies, perhaps only in the literal sense.

We will be reflecting on graduate-student professionalization through a discussion of two texts on the subject, John Guillory's "Preprofessionalism: What Graduate Students Want," ADE Bulletin 113 (Spring 1996). and Walter Broughton and William Conlogue's "What Search Committees Want", Profession 2001.

Jeff Glover G6 will be helping to lead the discussion. Many thanks to Professor Janice Carlisle, Craig Fehrman, Jeff Glover, and Gabriele Hayden for helping to prepare this event. AG and CG may add additional discussion questions here on the blog, but in the meantime this placeholder entry can serve as a place for discussion. Please feel free to use the comment function to post questions and thoughts. Follow the link below for some additional notes by AG.


Broughton and Conlogue use the Carnegie classification of higher education. More information on the classifications can be found at the Carnegie Foundation's website, on this page. The Carnegie foundation no longer uses the system referred to by Broughton and Conlogue (Research I, Research II...); the Wikipedia entry on the classifications explains the changes.

John Guillory has written at more length on the subject of graduate-student professionalization, in "The System of Graduate Education" [JSTOR], PMLA 115, no. 5 (October 2000): 1154-63.

Click here for the full blog entry.

Gray/Freud/Kohut, 4/21: Minutes

On April 21 we met to discuss Sigmund Freud's "On Narcissism: An Introduction" and Heinz Kohut's "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism" [link on Yale network only]. Patrick Gray led our lively debate and discussion. He also provided several supplemental readings:



Many thanks to Jordan Zweck for taking notes for the minutes below. As always, participants and other readers are very welcome to expand on their comments and to add new ones. Please follow the link below for the full minutes.


Readers take note: What follows is, despite its dialogue format, NOT a precise transcription; it is a joint reconstruction by JZ and AG. Nor are participants' comments in our informal setting meant to be taken either as unassailable statements of fact or as rigorous defenses of position. The participants in this discussion often disagreed about basic matters of fact and of principle. We leave it to readers to resolve these matters as best they can. The purpose of these minutes is to record the themes of our discussion and to give an illustration of our conversations about using theory, in the hopes that this illustration will provoke further discussion.

Present: Patrick Gray, Emily Coit, Colin Gillis, Andrew Goldstone, Margaret Homans, Justin Jannise, Ben Labreche, Jordan Zweck

Patrick Gray: My definition of psychoanalysis--a general category rather than Freud or Freudian psychoanalysis, though Freud invented the term--is analysis of the soul. Psychoanalysis has a long tradition going back before Freud (Descartes, etc.).

PG: Criticisms of psychoanalysis: It's not scientifically sound. One well-known articulation of this in English literary criticism is Lee Patterson's "Chaucer's Pardoner on the Couch: Clio and Psyche" [JSTOR], Speculum 76, no. 3 (July, 2001): 638--80. PG gave some references to defenses of the scientific validity and therapeutic effectiveness of psychoanalysis, including a return to Freud within cognitive psychology:

  • Jeremy Holmes. "The Assault on Freud." Current Opinion in Psychiatry 9, no. 3 (May 1996): 175-76.
  • Jim Rosack. "More Data Demonstrate Efficacy of Psychotherapy." Psychiatric News 36, no. 3 (February 2, 2001).
  • Drew Westen. "The Scientific Legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a Psychodynamically Informed Psychological Science." Psychological Bulletin 124, no. 3 (November 1998): 333-71.

PG also gave references on the kinship of cognitive-behavioral therapy to psychodynamic therapy:

  • Alan F. Javel. "The Freudian Antecedents of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy." Journal of Psychotherapy Integration 9, no. 4 (1999): 397-407.
  • Jane Milton. "Psychoanalysis and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy--Rival Paradigms or Common Ground?" International Journal of Psychoanalysis 82 (2001): 431-47.
  • Eric M. Plakun. "Finding Psychodynamic Psychiatry's Lost Generation." Journal of the American Acaademy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry 34 (2006): 135-50.
  • Drew Westen. "Commentary: Implicit and Emotional Processes in Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy." Clinical Psychology 7, no. 4: 386-90.


PG: What is Freud's contribution? He's notorious for the libido theory, but then Newton wrote a lot about alchemy, too. A few basic ideas were essential, like Newton's refutation of Aristotle with his gravitational theory of "action at a distance." But Freud's original work was the hypothesis that hysteria was the result of displaced emotion, not organic brain damage. The mind plays a role in the disease. Now Freud thought, as he says in "On Narcissism," that eventually all mental events would be explainable on a material basis, but his theory tends instead to suggest immaterial causes. In any case, it is neither simply true nor simply false that psychoanalysis is scientifically sound. That depends on its definition.

PG: Now a second major objection to psychoanalysis is historicist and constructivist. One famous articulation of this from Renaissance studies is Stephen Greenblatt's "Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture" (in Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, ed. Patricia Parker and David Quint; rpt. in Greeblatt's Learning to Curse). Greenblatt argues that psychoanalysis derives from rather than precedes or explains developments in the Renaissance. He gives a picture of a radical break between medieval and early modern subjectivities. This has been attacked by Richard Levin, and PG is preparing an essay on Greenblatt's errors. But Greenblatt's favorable turn to Lacan has influenced Renaissance studies. See for example the recent anthology Historicism, Psychoanalysis, and Early Modern Culture, ed. Carla Mazzio and Douglas Trevor. (This turn to Lacan--mirrored in the selections on psychoanalysis in anthologies of literary theory--distorts the field of psychoanalysis and indeed misses all the theorists relevant to psychoanalysis today. Lacan is regarded as a quack in Anglo-American psychoanalysis.) Many ideas associated with Freud and Lacan are much older. For sublimation, see Montaigne; for denial, see Aesop's fable of The Fox and the Grapes. In short, they look back to faculty psychology, to Aristotle and the classics--as Freud often remarks. Now this leads Greenblatt to say psychoanalysis comes from the Renaissance; but he overlooks the transhistorical persistence of these ideas. For PG, these really indicate truths of human nature.

PG wants to use the idea of the ego-ideal to reconcile cultural and psychoanalytic approaches. The ego-ideal can also be a cultural ideal. Theology could be seen as a defining characteristic of a culture because that is what sets up the culture's ego-ideal.

Ben Labreche: How are you using this in your dissertation?

PG: I discuss stoicism in Shakespeare's Roman plays. The Romans believe in an impassable God, so they are reluctant to acknowledge their own passivity and mistakes--in contrast to a Christian God, who can suffer and act.

Emily Coit: Your references seem to distinguish psychoanalysis from psychotherapy. Is that right?

PG: Kohut said he did psychotherapy, not psychoanalysis. All these terms--interpersonal, psychodynamic, etc.--can be united under the etymological sense of psycho-analytic. I relate this to the concept we learned about from Lisa Zunshine: Theory of Mind or "mind-reading." Interpretation of minds. Many ways.

EC: AG's blog comments focused on methodology. Does the current incarnation of psychoanalysis have a different methodology?

PG: I would say that there are lots of things science can't really rule on, like theology. The competence of science in certain spheres of inquiry has led people to want to apply it everywhere, including in literary criticism. It's an overstepping of bounds.

AG: This is a useful either/or moment. If the choice is between, on one side, the qualitative, the subjective, the singular, and on the other the material, the scientific, the generalizable, and you put psychoanalysis on the former side, then I see that a psychoanalytic approach actually does require admitting non-material causes. That's useful, because it tells me that if I do not admit those causes--and I absolutely do not admit them--I don't have to take on board a psychoanalytic approach.

PG: In speaking of the material causes of mind, it's one thing to say mind is a product of the brain, and another to reject non-material qualities of mind. To say everything is material would mean that thoughts are things in the brain.

AG: This is the philosphical question of the existence and nature of "qualia." See Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained, especially the chapter "Qualia Disqualified."

CG: PG's introduction suggested that he, and psychoanalysis, make transhistorical claims about human nature. But if there are precendents for Freudian concepts in Western European texts, that doesn't necessarily prove a transhistorical, universal human nature. Freud read those classical European texts in his education and was influenced by them. You need stronger evidence for the transhistorical claim. Could you find evidence for this human nature in Native American or Chinese culture? Could you give an explanation of how these aspects of human nature evolved by natural selection? Because Aesop, Montaigne, and Freud just aren't that far apart.

PG: I'm not qualified to talk about other cultures. That's really an anthropology question. Nonetheless, there is a remarkable continuity in the human psyche. I can understand translations of ancient Chinese literature.

AG: Okay, but that doesn't mean any of the accounts, including the psychoanalytic one, that seem comparable can be used to explain all the others. The causes for the historical continuity still need to be demonstrated.

PG: What is the proper scope of a literary critic? I use psychoanalysis only for analogy; its concepts help me describe the authors I'm studying. Let me give another example. Jung describes ideas of the anima and animus, female and male natures inside each gender. That's useful for describing what's going on in Shakespeare when he personifies aspects of men's psyches as female, but in saying that I'm not saying the anima is real or that Shakespeare is a psychoanalyist. I don't take the step of saying Shakespeare was right about the mind---that isn't our purview as literary critics.

EC: You're explaining by analogy, then?

PG: Yes, as far as I'm only doing literary criticism.

CG: I wouldn't want to totally dismiss your use of psychoanalytic texts, but you did say that the similarities between Montaigne and Shakespeare and Freud reveal transhistorical human nature. But you didn't have to. As literary critics, we're discussing cultural representations.

PG: I think this argument, about what explains the beliefs of the authors I study, can be separated from literary criticism. New Historicists like to move horizontally within a culture, but I want to move through time.

AG: That's a stronger claim than the claim that you only want psychoanalysis as an analogy. For if there were only analogy, what would it mean? What matters is what explains the analogy.

PG: I concede the point.

BL: But let's talk about your research topic of Stoicism in particular. Do you really need to make claims about universal human nature to make your arguments about Stoicism in Renaissance culture?

PG: In some ways, yes. In literary criticism, we feel that we have to go back to material causes, especially economic ones, but I believe in immaterial causes. To explain a work of literature is to translate it from particulars into a more general statement of the author's belief about humanity. We can leave why an author believes what he believes out of our picture, and we can leave put own beliefs aside when we do literary criticism.

CG: I'd be skeptical of claiming to derive Shakespeare's beliefs from the Riverside Shakespeare. There should be diversity in ideological issues in our field, but truth matters. Even on a practical level: if PG and I were on the same faculty and planning an undergraduate curriculum, we wouldn't agree about what approaches and texts undergraduates should be required to read. I would want courses with a social-constructivist approach, and you wouldn't.

AG: Right, what you proposed about the task of the critic isn't neutral; it is itself a set of claims about what literature is and how it works--that it offers specific examples than can be generalized. So you don't have to be a total relativist; you could argue for a much more forceful and particular version of the basis for your approach.

PG: In my experience, all literary criticism involves this translation from particular to universal. Even Greenblatt says Shakespeare's plays are a personal perspective on reality. When did we become an anthropology department? Why don't we just do literary criticism?

CG: We're a minor social science. That's fine. We should have some standards of truthfulness.

EC: Somehow PG has become the relativist and CG an absolutist. Funny. I'd like to add another term: morality. A recent Yale Daily News op-ed piece ("Shvarts explains her 'repeated self-induced miscarriages'") by Aliza Shvarts defending her senior art project disturbed me with its use of a literary-critical discourse we're all comfortable with. My initial reaction was: If only she'd read George Eliot, she'd never have made these errors. We are teachers, and we have a responsibility to students. We have to trace out the effects of our theoretical work. If I know that PG is a humanist in real life, how do I reconcile that with the relativist position he's advocating here? And CG--

CG: [raises eyebrows] I'm a post-humanist.

EC: What happens when we put morality and humanism on the table?

CG: I don't think PG and I are that far apart. I want to believe literary criticism is a form of knowledge production that doesn't just move from trend to trend, but actually progresses. Evidence-based literary criticism is essential to this. If we're going to take up psychoanalysis, I want it to be evidence-based. Some modes of literary criticism have been discredited, and that's okay, but if it's impossible to disprove a form of criticism, then no knowledge can be produced by it.

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Sunday, April 20, 2008

Gray/Freud/Kohut, 4/21: Discussion Questions

Our next Using Theory lunch takes place tomorrow, Monday, April 21, at 12:30 p.m. We will be debating the status of psychoanalysis for the humanities, as Patrick Gray leads a discussion of Freud's "On Narcissism" and Heinz Kohut's "Forms and Transformations of Narcissism."

In the meantime, CG and AG offer some preliminary thoughts and questions, as a way to set up the debate; to read them, follow the link below.


AG: Although I recognize that there are interesting passages and side-points we might discuss in the readings, I want instead to try to put the big question as strongly as possible. What possible use could any form of psychoanalysis have within literary studies, given its invalidity as an account of human psychology? Why pay any attention to something so wrong?

Of course, many in literary studies would by no means accept that psychoanalysis is invalid as an account of psychology. But this is the consensus of the scientific community, and for reasons that even humanists ought to, but seemingly often don't, understand. Other people can explain the consensus and the reasons far better than this humanist, but, since we are blogging, here is my version. The discrediting reasons are more than visible in the Freud essay--the reliance on reasoning by analogy, the tremendous apparatus of unfalsifiable hypotheses (e.g. sublimation, p. 74: certain desires are really, underlying sexual, even though they are not sexual in any observable way), the pervasive gender, sexual, and racial stereotypes shaping the "explanations." (Freud's stereotypes are common for his time and place, of course, but the point is that they are used as the principal evidence for major psychoanalytic claims, especially ones about sexual desire. If the stereotypes are untrue, then the claims lack evidence.) Freud's bad understanding of evolution also looms large, in the way he essentializes and opposes reproductive and self-preserving instincts. And then the central ideas of "energy" or "libido" flowing through the psyche have about the same scientific status as analogous notions from many cultures--qi in traditional Chinese thought, for example--which is to say, they serve as infinitely flexible cover terms for many heterogeneous phenomena. Freud's--and Kohut's--use of the vocabulary of science should not deceive any but the most naive readers. For them, "empirical" observation seems to consist entirely in the ad-hoc interpretation of single clinical cases--and they usually assert the validity of their theory on the basis of the clinical successes they claim to have made by following it. These are norms of evidence which have been out of date since Francis Bacon.

What I am saying, in short, is that psychoanalysis is folk science. That doesn't mean it isn't very interesting for cultural history and for the history of science, in the same way as astrology or alchemy are. Freud certainly did open up ways of thinking about mental processes that have been important in the development of scientific understandings of the brain. But mostly he, along with the pseudo-discipline he inaugurated, testifies to the enduring appeal of manifestly invalid kinds of reasoning. (In light of Lisa Zunshine's session, I reflect that psychoanalysis makes strong appeals to our Theory of Mind capacities, because it populates the mind with a whole set of homunculi--ego, superego, id--all of them acting just like persons, with intentions, strategems, etc.) But when it comes to formulating and trying to answer questions about how the mind works, we now have something better, in the accumulated knowledge of empirical science and in the philosophy of mind--principally Anglo-American--which is developing in concert with that science.

My own suspicion (not, of course, unique or original to me; compare Frederick Crews' statements in this PBS interview), which depresses me tremendously, is that psychoanalysis retains its appeal in the humanities precisely because it is unscientific. Psychoanalysis--posed, despite its protestations to the contrary, against reason and empiricism, dependent on the individual case study for "evidence," endlessly staging and celebrating the sophistical ingenuity of the analyst--offers humanists a vision of the triumph of humanism over science. Freud's and his successors' love for quoting and appropriating literature and myth reinforces this vision by granting to literature an unsurpassable insight into human cognition. Given the manifest victory of science as the premiere form of knowledge (the existence of "creation science" testifies to this prestige better than anything else could) in our culture, such a vision has obvious appeal to humanistic disciplines struggling to be taken seriously by the wider culture and to keep their hold on institutional resources. [John Guillory has offered convincing descriptions of this struggle and its ideological products in Cultural Capital and related work since, especially his 2002 Critical Inquiry essay "The Sokal Affair and the History of Criticism".] Needless to say I also think psychoanalysis' vision is wholly phantasmatic and ought to be discarded forthwith. Literary studies should place itself in something other than a blindly oppositional relation to scientific knowledge and scientific methods.

Now let me imagine utopia for a moment. Suppose that the bankrupcy of psychoanalysis as an account of the workings of the mind were fully acknowledged within literary studies and its cultural prestige annulled. Psychoanalytic understandings of desire, motivation, development, memory, and language production would no longer contaminate interpretations of these themes by literary critics, who could then take up Zunshine's call for a criticism that would understand historically specific interactions between our cognitive capacities--as far as we understand them--and cultural formations. What use might then be made of the interesting cultural artifact of late-19th/early-20th century pseudoscience that was psychoanalysis? What comparative method would be adequate? And would there be any payoff?

CG: I share AG's skepticism about psychoanalysis as a theory of mind as a theoretical framework for literary scholarship. I think using Freud or his psychoanalytic followers (however far they depart from The Founder's original system of ideas) to describe some universal and transhistorical feature of human nature, without acknowledging the contested status of psychoanalysis as a theory of mind, is a deeply problematic enterprise; indeed, it verges on dishonesty. If we as literary scholars are going to use psychology to analyze literature and to explain the creative processes of the author and the reading practices of his audience, then it is our responsibility as scholars to use the most truthful theory of psychology, not merely the most attractive one (or the most attractively complex). This means that we should respect the consensus of our colleagues in the sciences, when there is a consensus (and there is a consensus regarding psychoanalysis, as Andrew stresses); and keep up with ongoing debates in the fields of psychology most relevant literary scholarship.

However, I'm not quite ready to toss all 24 volumes of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud onto the fire just yet. The present and past cultural prestige of Freud and Freudian theory, however misplaced, means that Freud will continue to demand the attention of scholars of the twentieth century (and probably of the twenty-first as well). That is to say, psychoanalysis may be a pseudo-science, but it has been more influential than astrology or alchemy and, indeed, we still feel its influence today. As many historians of sexuality have observed, Freud played an important role in the emergence of the modern concept of sexuality as a crucially important yet partially knowable domain of the self. We live in a world made possible, in part, by Freud, and, by analyzing psychoanalysis as a cultural artifact, we can show how certain things (like modern categories of sexual identity, e. g. heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, etc.) are not immutable facts of natural reality but historical phenomena. For this reason alone, I believe Freud should and will remain a major subject of scholarship in the humanities for decades to come. Before Freud's historical influence can fully be assessed, however, Freud (and all of psychoanalytic theory) must be returned to its original historical context--the vestiges of which are visible in Freud's citation of and passing references to other psychological and medical scientific work in "On Narcissism: An Introduction." (Freud's works are an archive that would benefit hugely from digitization. Imagine you could instantly click through html links to all of Freud's sources!)

The question that I'll pose for our discussion concerns the status of current scholarship that draws on psychoanalytic concepts. I'm not ready to toss this stuff on the fire either, and not simply because it's been influential in our field. (This brings us right back the issue of citation and authority that AG brought up regarding Althusser in the last post and that PR expanded on in his comment.) A lot of extremely valuable and interesting scholarship has made use of Freudian theory (Eve Sedgwick and Judith Butler come to mind first). Is it possible to use such scholarship while also recognizing that psychoanalysis is a flawed and outmoded science? And, if so, what is the most responsible way to do that?

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Thursday, April 10, 2008

Minutes, 4/10/08: Colin Gillis/Elizabeth Povinelli

Present: CG, Anne DeWitt, Jeff Glover, Andrew Goldstone, Gabriele Hayden, Ben Labreche, Patrick Redding, Jordan Zweck

Due to the negligence, prompted by excitement at the discussion and absent-mindedness in equal parts, of AG the minute-taker, the following notes on the discussion are short. CG has generously supplied the typescript of his lucid introductory remarks. Participants are warmly invited to restate or elaborate their comments here. For the full minutes, follow the link below.


Colin Gillis: Introduction. Povinelli is an anthropologist. Her first two books, Labor's Lot and The Cunning of Recognition, are about the place of aboriginal peoples in Australia's multicultural liberal democracy. Studying the process by which indigenous people in Australia constructed themselves as subjects in order to gain recognition from the Australian government, and her own deeply disorienting experience moving between queer culture in North America and the indigenous social world of northwestern Australia, has allowed Povinelli to see that the discourses of individual freedom and social constraint--which she refers to as the autological subject and the genealogical society--are what constitute bodies, sociality, and love in late liberalism. Povinelli describes The Empire of Love as a critique of Late Liberalism. I understand "late liberalism" to mean a political philosophy that originated in Europe, became the ideological basis for modern Western democracies, and has been exported and continues to be exported to such an extent that has become globally hegemonic. The core commitment of liberalism is liberty--the belief that humans are naturally free; and that any restraint on individual freedom must be justified. In other words, liberalism conceives of persons in terms of individual freedom and social restraint, and implicitly values freedom and self-determination.

Why does Povinelli prefer the terms "the autological subject" and "the genealogical society," or "autological discourse" and "genealogical discourse," to "individual freedom" and "social restraint"? I think it's because these terms provide some distance between her critique and the vocabulary of liberalism, because they clearly signal that they describe forms of discourse and not material realities, and because they're more flexible--genealogy isn't negative, like social constraint, and it includes things like kinship; and autology isn't automatically positive, like individual freedom, and describes individual freedom as a process of self-actualization not a given fact of natural reality. In the introduction to The Empire of Love, Povinelli defines the terms this way:


By the autological subject, I am referring to discourses, practices, and fantasies about self-making, self-sovereignty, and the value of individual freedom associated with the Enlightenment project of contractual constitutional democracy and capitalism. By genealogical society, I am referring to discourses, practices, and fantasies about social constraints placed on the autological subject by various kinds of inheritances. (4)

In the chapter of The Empire of Love from which the selection in the packet is taken, Povinelli uses a sore that she acquired while living in the aboriginal community in Belyuen as a way of exploring how her body is constituted by autology and genealogy. The social world of Belyuen is one of thick kinship relations and face-to-face sociality: there, people live in poverty and in nearly constant physical contact; sores are common; and doctors regard them with indifference. The social world of North America, specifically Montreal during the diver-cité gay pride festival, is one of stranger sociality: people take individual responsibility for their health and are obligated to warn potential sexual partners when they have an infection; they expect to live a long time; sores of the type that Povinelli has are rare and potentially a cause for great concern among the doctors she visits. Because autology and genealogy are configured differently in the social worlds of Belyuen and Montreal, the sore actually is two different things in those social worlds--if Povinelli were an aboriginal person who had lived all her life in northwestern Australia, she would accept the sore as a fact of life; or, if she were a North American tourist who had visited some exotic locale and picked up the sore there, she would see it as a medical emergency. But because Povinelli herself inhabits the stranger sociality of North America and the thick kinship lifeworld of Belyuen simultaneously, the sore is neither one of those things--her flesh is actually strained between two incommensurate lifeworlds.

What her experience with the sore reveals, I think, is two things:

  1. That it is possible to manage the way one's body is constituted by autology and genealogy. The meaning of the sore--which seems obvious in each separate social world--is actually something that Povinelli herself can and does alter as she moves between them. She thinks carefully about what she tells and doesn't tell her doctors in North America so that she can receive treatment, without causing too much alarm but while also being responsible. And, in Australia, she seeks care in a way that others wouldn't: she has the sore treated with minor surgery and she asks that her friend cut the sore without feeling sorry for her; she can hold herself down for treatment, as she puts it. Her ability to manage how her body is constituted in these different social worlds opens up space for experimentation with new modes of life.
  2. That the incommensurability of the discursive constitution of her body in Belyuen and in North America has dire material consequences. It is the reason why her indigenous kin are condemned to live what is essentially a slow death while her friends in the North America expect to live a long life and structure their sexual lives in light of that expectation. Ghoul health--which Povinelli defines as "the global organization of the biomedical establishment, and its imaginary," around the fear that the next plague is the real threat that haunts the global division of developed and undeveloped worlds--arises from and produces her sore's double meaning. Certain populations are stuck with horrific health conditions because healthcare resources are distributed according to a discursive distinction between the ordinary bodies of stranger sociality and the exceptional bodies of persons who inhabit a thick kinship sociality.


Povinelli wants to show how autological and genealogical discourses shape life on a huge scale, from the personal experiences of her and her friends to the uneven distribution of global resources that has emerged in the wake of settler colonialism. In a word, she wants her work to be disturbing: Disturbing is a good description of the effect of reading these essays, and it is a keyword for Povinelli: she wants to dislodge critical discourse from its moorings in Late Liberalism and find a vocabulary capable of describing the complexity of social relations in the world that has been created by the discourse of late liberalism. This is how she puts it in the introduction:

My goal is not to say yes or no to individual freedom and social constraint, the intimate event or the genealogical society. All I can hope is that by understanding how these discourses work to shape social life, we can begin to fomulate a positive
political program--something I have begun to describe as a politics of "thick life"--in which the density of social representation is increased to meet the density of actual social worlds. (21)

Now we should talk more about how Povinelli conceives of social representation as a positive political program--this is the question of mediation that Andrew raised on the using theory blog. Bracketing this question for the moment, I think that the first part Povinelli's argument--that our current modes of social representation are incapable of describing the "density of actual social worlds" is immediately valuable to us as critics.

I think one of the most basic objectives of using theory is to be disturbed. We read theory so that it will shake our preconceptions, make us disillusioned with our current vocabulary and our current set of analytical tools, and feel that we urgently need to replace them. The best theory also disturbs our assumptions about who we are as scholars, and what our duties and responsibilities are both to ourselves and to what we study. Now, the specific way in which I'm planning to use Povinelli is less profound, but I think it models one really practical way that we can respond to something like The Empire of Love by changing our day to day practice as critics. In about two weeks, I'll be giving a paper at the ACLA for a panel on sexual tourism. The paper is based on a short position paper that I wrote for a seminar on the same topic last fall for the MSA. It compares two texts: "The Woman Who Rode Away," a short story by the English writer D. H. Lawrence; and Season of Migration to the North, a novel by the Sudanese author al-Tayyeb Salih. In "The Woman Who Rode Away," an unnamed female protagonist leaves her family and, motivated by a primitivist fantasy, travels to a remote indigenous tribe in the mountains of Mexico. Once she arrives, she is promptly captured, drugged, and then ritually sacrificed in an ice cave. In Season of Migration to the North, the protagonist, Mustafa Sa'eed, a Sudanese man, travels from the global South to London, the colonial metropole, to study; and, while he's there, he plays on English women's primitivist fantasies, has sex with many of them, marries one, and eventually murders her. He then returns to Sudan, marries a Sudanese woman, and then disappears (it is suggested that he commits suicide); at the end of the novel, it is revealed that in his home in Sudan, there is a locked room containing an English library and a portrait of his dead English wife.

My seminar paper used these texts as examples to argue that the structural violence of colonialism foreclosed the possibility of intimacy between colonizer and colonized. And that the violence in these stories literalizes the fantasies domination and submission with which imperialism is inextricably bound up. Reading Povinelli has altered my original argument and provided a better, more precise vocabulary for articulating it. Now, what I am going to argue, is that moving between incommensurate social worlds unmoors the identities of these two characters. And this unmooring reveals that the liberal humanist claim that what makes us most human is our ability to recognize and value the freedom of another person in our intimate lives is also what sustains the structural violence of colonialism. Lawrence and Salih aren't just interested in the fantasies bound up with imperialism. These texts explore the way in which love is a site--in fact, the site--in which imperial power is deployed and can be resisted.

Discussion.Our discussion returned multiple times to the question of the historical presuppositions in Povinelli's text. When and how did autological and genealogical discourses arise? Are there aspects of these discourses which are not products of Late Liberalism? Jeff Glover wondered whether the tendency is to imply that indigeneity and traditional culture simply have no existence before liberal discourse imposes itself and creates them as an other; but for JG, oral culture is real and does have a history which is not restricted to the genealogical discourse invented by settler society. CG replied that perhaps Povinelli is saying we don't have the right tools for thinking about the pre-colonial period. AG wondered whether autology and genealogy might not be highly generalizable concepts, far predating modern imperialism and modern liberalism. Indeed, Ben Labreche is working with the conflict between individual self-making and the constraints of inheritance in his research. Patrick Redding noted that in general anthropology is more oriented towards comparative cultures in present time than towards history. Gabriele Hayden concurred and noted the allusion to Fabian's work on time and anthropology in Povinelli's South Atlantic Quarterly article.

A second thread of discussion concentrated on Povinelli's politics. GH and BL had reservations about her queer politics. Povinelli's discussion of the Radical Fairies came up, but CG has been focusing on her treatment of the Belyuen community. BL wondered: what is she calling for? CG: thicker social representations. BL: Is this just better liberalism?

Finally, PR asked about CG's notion that the purpose of Using Theory is to be disturbed. Is this a contrast with Susannah Hollister's approach to the Marxist theorists she is using? Would CG take on board Povinelli's methodological and political positions? CG: yes, these do matter. Theory isn't just something picked out of the anthology to support what you were already going to do.

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